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Article 1

AFTER ARTHURS - A PREFACE TO

THE SYMPOSIUM ON CANADIAN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
By J.D. MCCAMUS*

This symposium issue of the Journal is devoted to a discussion of
the present state and future prospects of Canadian legal scholarship in
a variety of areas of enquiry. It will be obvious that it is inspired, in
part at least, by Law and Learning, the report to the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada by the Consultative Group
on Research and Education in Law (the Arthurs Report)., It is appropriate,
therefore, that the symposium includes a call to arms from the Report's
principal architect, President Harry Arthurs. With one exception, the
remaining papers represent attempts by scholars from across the country
to offer either an account or a critical assessment of the current state
of Canadian legal scholarship in particular areas of enquiry, and to offer
some guidance as to the kinds of work the contributors feel could be
fruitfully undertaken in the future.
The one exception to this pattern is a contribution from the Editorin-Chief in which he offers a skeptical view of the "humanistic pluralism"
which is said to underlie the analysis of the Arthurs Report and urges
that only a more radical transformation of Canadian legal scholarship
will effect significant change. One suspects that this particular contribution
will be welcomed by the authors of the Report as a refreshing change
from the more common charges of undue iconoclasm and excessive
reformist zeal.
Members of the Canadian legal academic community well know
that the Arthurs Report has been considered a controversial document.
It is surprising that this is so, for the major thrust of the Report, the
encouragement of more theoretical and interdisciplinary scholarly work
in law, is hardly controversial. And yet the Arthurs Report has provoked
considerable debate at law schools across the country. Indeed, there are
those -

one suspects them to be a very small minority -

who not

only question both the diagnosis and the prescribed remedy offered in
o Copyright, 1985, John D. McCamus.
* Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School.

(1983) (Chair. H.W. Arthurs).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 23 No. 3

the Report for the current ills of Canadian scholarship in law, but who
see the Report as having a potentially pernicious influence.
Part of the explanation for this antagonistic response, I believe, is
that the Report contains little or nothing in the way of a celebration
of the achievements of Canadian legal scholarship. Indeed, the positive
side of the story could have received more emphasis than it did in the
-Report. Given 'the relatively recent emergence of the legal academic
profession in Canada, it is remarkable that as large and rich a body
of literature as now exists has been created. As the Arthurs Report
indicates, much of it fits within the mould of conventional or traditional
scholarship. Much of it does not, however, and in any event it would
have been fair for.the Report to point out that the conventional work
needed to be done and will, perhaps to a lesser extent, be required in
the future. The Report might also have noted that the alleged deficiencies
of Canadian legal scholarship find their parallels in other jurisdictions
and, moreover, that the finest work by Canadian scholars compares well
with the finest work of scholars in other jurisdictions, and so on. Those
who lament this alleged deficiency in the Arthurs Report appear to be
concerned that unsophisticated readers from other jurisdictions and
disciplines will draw unduly negative conclusions about the current state
-of the art in Canada. No doubt there is some basis for this concern. 2
And yet, there can surely be few who would not agree that there is
substantial room for improvement in what we do, and that the path to
improvement lies, in part at least, in the directions charted in the Arthurs
Report.
A less defensive reaction to the Arthurs Report would be to view
it as a harbinger of the coming of age of Canadian legal scholarship.
Imagine having so substantial a body of scholarship that it can be studied,
assessed, and, indeed, criticised for being too heavily focused in certain
areas of enquiry. My own experience as a law student in the late 1960s
was that there was very little Canadian secondary literature to draw
upon. The achievements of the past twenty-five years are, in this context,
quite remarkable. Perhaps there would have been no harm, then, if the
authors of the Report had thrown a few more bouquets. But surely, a
vibrant discipline welcomes searching criticism as well as praise.

2 See, eg., the general tone of a review of the Report by I. Fletcher, an English law teacher
in (1984) 4 Leg. Stud. 349 at 349-50 where, to be fair, the reviewer suggests that Canada may
simply be an "extreme case" of a "more universal malaise." Cf W.D. Moull, "Law and the Social
Sciences in Canadian Legal Education: Some Perspectives on the Arthurs Report" (1984) 34 J.
Leg. Ed. 515 at 516-8, attributing current Canadian -problems to, inter alia, the malign influence
of English academic tradition, and quoting, with respect to the English scene, Professor Ronald

Dworkin's acerbicassessment in "Legal Research" (1973) 102:2 Daedalus 53.
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This is not to say, of course, that the Arthurs Report is itself immune
to criticism. Indeed, one suspects that its somewhat provocative tone
was meant to stimulate debate. If so, that strategy has succeeded. It
is not too much to say that the debate it has sparked at law schools
across'the country is one of the Report's most important legacies. The
present symposium is meant to explore an aspect of the Report's analysis
that is not fully developed in the Report itself. Even those who are
sympathetic to the general thrust of the Report would have to agree
that it provides only a very abstract and general view of the kinds of
theoretical and interdisciplinary work it wishes to encourage. We know,
for example, that the Report means to encourage a greater degree of
interdisciplinary work. But that being said, the Report offers little guidance
as to the precise direction this work should take. Indeed, the Report
might be thought by some to have an undiscriminating view of the value
of such work. Can it be that all interdisciplinary collaboration is destined
to be fruitful? Does past experience with interdisciplinary work here and
abroad offer useful guidance with. respect to the areas of enquiry or
forms of collaboration that are most likely to succeed? Does the Report
mean to suggest that interdisciplinary work per se, regardless of its
methodology and objectives, is to be encouraged and, perhaps, given
priority over other kinds of scholarship? What is interdisciplinary work?
Is it possible, as the Arthurs Report seems inclined to suggest, to distinguish
with relative ease between research 'in' and research 'on' law? In the
area of contract law, for example, we know that empirical research on
contracting practices will be placed on one side of the divide and most
pedestrian doctrinal analysis on the other, but when does legal scholarship
which 'draws upon' other disciplines move from one category to the
next? On questions such as these, the Arthurs Report operates - perhaps
inevitably - at a high level of generality with which it is, of course,
almost impossible to disagree. It is a level that many will find unsatisfying,
however.
More telling vagueness is to be found in the Report's discussion
of "theoretical" work in law. Readers of the Report no doubt still recall
the now famous box3 into .which the "Types of Legal Research" are
placed. At the top of the box is a thin layer of "Legal Theory" and
"Fundamental Research" which is said to be currently under-represented
in the canon of Canadian legal scholarship and which it is the aim of
the Report to encourage. "Legal Theory" is defined by the Report in
the following terms: "legal theory - research designed to yield a unifying
theory or perspective by which legal rules may be understood, and their
3 Supra, note I at 67.
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application in particular cases evaluated and controlled; this type would
include scholarly commentary on civil law, usually referred to as doctrine."4
That this definition should include mention of doctrinal work in the civilian
tradition is intriguing. The Report apparently means to suggest that
doctrinal work in civil law is more theoretical in nature than doctrinal
work in common law. But on what grounds could the authors of the
Report have concluded that the writing of a treatise on the civil law
of obligations is theoretically more complex an activity than the work
of, say, Linden,5 Waddams,6 or Waters?7 Is the definition meant to exclude
doctrinal scholarship in public law? Surely, public law scholarship of
this genre is not less theoretical than work in private law, whether
undertaken by scholars of civilian or common law training. Similarly,
when measured by this definition of legal theory, it must be conceded
that much of the content of modem Canadian law reviews aspires to
be and, indeed, is theoretical. Contrary to the views of some readers,
then, the Report appears to have a rather comprehensive view of the
kind of work that may constitute "legal theory." If all this is so, however,
the Report's conclusion that the vast preponderance of Canadian work
is atheoretical and merely "conventional," that is, "research designed
to collect and organize legal data, to expound legal rules, and to explicate
or offer exegesis upon authoritative legal sources"8 simply cannot stand.
Perhaps it is, after all, quite unsurprising that the Arthurs Report
does not attempt to offer a precise view of the kinds of interdisciplinary
work that ought to be undertaken, and does not appear to offer a coherent
view of what might constitute "theoretical" as opposed to "conventional"
research in law. In this respect, the Report simply reflects a prevailing
lack of consensus in the legal academic community concerning the aims
and objectives of scholarly work in law and the role of 'theory' within
it. In recent years, for example, there has been a substantial increase
in the production of self-consciously theoretical work about private law.
And yet, it is often quite unclear what the 'theory' in any particular
case is meant to explain and what kinds, of evidence, therefore, would
serve either to undermine or validate it.
To choose an illustration from a literature with which I have some
familiarity, there is apparently an important difference on a matter of

4 Ibid. at

66.
A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 3d ed. (1982).
6 S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts,2d ed. (1984).
7 D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada,2d ed. (1984).
8 Supra, note I at 65.
5
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theory separating Professor Atiyah9 on the one hand, from Lord Goff,
Professor Jones,,o and Professor Birks,, on the other. Simply stated, the
latter group favours the reshaping of the English law of quasi-contract
and constructive trust into a law of restitution based on the unjust
enrichment model, more or less in the manner of the American Restatement
of the Law of Restitution.2 Professor Atiyah vehemently disagrees on
grounds which he and no doubt others would view as theoretical in some
sense.'3 Professor Atiyah has in mind a rather different plan for "redrawing
the conceptual categories of the law", which will include within it a
"new theoretical structure for contract, which will place it more firmly
in association with the rest of the law of obligations"15 and which will
subsume the law of restitution in a broader category of doctrines organized
around "the idea of recompense for benefit."16
There is no question that the quality of the scholarship undertaken
on both sides of this issue is remarkably impressive and, indeed, ranks
among the finest achievements of private law scholarship in this century.
Further, there appears to be no room for doubt that the point of theory
separating these writers is an important one. It is not at all clear, however,
what the point of theory in question is all about. Do these writers disagree
on a rather practical question of how the law ought to be organized
by treatise writers in order to, say, facilitate effective performance by
various actors in the legal process (such as lawyers and judges who might
wish to increase their ability to remember existing doctrines, think of
fruitful analogies, or decide similar cases in like fashion)?,7 Or, do these
authors have different theories about how judges ought to decide particular
cases? Or, do they have different theories about the nature of "the value
systems underlying present day ideas"?,8 Or, about the actual relationship
or the desired relationship between such value systems and doctrine or
treatises about legal doctrine? Perhaps these writers have differing views
about what they see as the inarticulate major premises of the reported
9 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979).
10 R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 2d ed. (1978).

P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985).
P1
12 American Law Institute (1937).

13 Supra, note 9 at 764-70.
14 ibid

at 779.
bid at 778.
16 Ibid at 779.
17 For a suggestive analysis of how one might assess the success of such a venture, see R.A.
15

Samek, "Unjust Enrichment, QuasiContract and Restitution: A Study in Organising Legal Rules.

(1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
18 Supra, note 9 at 779.
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judicial decisions and how these considerations might best be :woven
into the fabric of the articulated doctrine. If these differences of opinion
rest on theories of the above kind, or some other kind, how are we
to referee among contending theorists? Certainly, the failure of the typical
work of private law theory to articulate its nature and purposes makes
such an assessment- difficult to effect.
Theoretical writing in law, at least in the private law of obligations,
is markedly reticent in attempting to articulate the nature and function
of underlying theory. No doubt this derives in part from the sorts of
professional pressures identified in the Arthurs Report. Much private law
scholarship, even quite theoretical work, is intended in part to have some
influence in professional circles. We work within a tradition, after all,
in which the judiciary has only recently come to the conclusion that
it is acceptable to refer to and rely upon the work of living authors.9
It is thus not surprising that much of our scholarship masks the creativity
and theoretical assumptions of the author in question. No doubt there
are other factors that explain this theoretical reticence such as the
complexity of the legal world and the inherent difficulty in theorizing
about it. Whatever the explanation, however, law is a discipline which
appears to be singularly lacking in a literature dealing with its own theories
of knowledge. What kinds of truths, if any, is legal scholarship meant
to uncover and, as importantly, how will we recognize them when we
find them?
Again, it is not surprising that a committee, even as distinguished
a committee as that chaired by President Arthurs, did not attempt to
grapple with issues of this kind. Nor, perhaps, is it surprising that a rich
literature of this kind has not yet developed here, or elsewhere. Nonetheless,
there is a growing literature, especially in the United- States, tackling
questions of this kind on a sophisticated and normally quite abstract
level, of which the recent symposium of the Yale Law Journal on "Legal
Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes"2o is perhaps the best known. The
present symposium takes a rather different approach to this problem
by attempting to develop, from the ground up as it were, some perspective
on the current state of our scholarship in particular substantive areas
and to identify a range of appropriate objectives for future research.
The strategy of many, if not all, of the contributors appears to be one

'9

See B. Laskin, The British Tradition in Canadian Law (1969) at 94-5; G.V.V. Nicholls,

"Legal Periodicals and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1950) 28 Can. Bar Rev. 422, criticizing
the refusal of Rinfrett, then Chief Justice of Canada, to allow counsel to refer during argument

to an article in the Canadian Bar Review in Reference re Validity of the Wartime Leasehold Regulation,
[1950] S.C.R. 124 and gathering Commonwealth illustrations to the contrary.
20

(1981) 90 Yale LJ. 955ff.
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of attempting to bring the Arthurs Report down to earth and to consider,
in the context of specific literatures and fields of enquiry, the need for
particular shifts in emphasis and direction for Canadian legal scholarship.
To varying degrees, they have, as part of this, exercise, attempted to
develop their own more general perspectives on the- objectives of legal
scholarship.
In so doing, the contributors have, as did the authors of the Report
before them, gathered together raw material that may ultimately assist
in the writing of an intellectual history of Canadian legal scholarship.
As well, it is hoped, they have created a resource that will stimulate
further thought along these lines from colleagues and graduate students
here and elsewhere, and from all others who are concerned with the
future directions of legal scholarship in Canada. We are much in their
debt.

-

